NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS
UNDER RULE lOb-5

Clause (2) of SEC Rule lOb-5, promulgated under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 proscribes the making of false
or misleading statements in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities. 2 Neither the Rule nor section 10(b) mentions civil liability,
but the courts have uniformly inferred a private remedy under the
Rule. 3 There is, however, no agreement on what the substantive elements of a lOb-5(2) private action, particularly with respect to the
elements of scienter and reliance, should be. 4 The primary problem
results from the ambiguity of the Rule's language. In resolving this
ambiguity, reference must be made to one or more rational guidelines, but the absence of express legislative directions regarding lOb-5
makes the choice and application of such guidelines difficult. Moreover,
attempts to formulate a scheme of recovery under lOb-5(2) must consider the implications of a prior, congressionally delineated civil remedy
whose scope potentially overlaps that of lOb-5(2). This comment suggests what the substantive elements of the lOb-5(2) misrepresentation
action5 should be in light of the overall goals of federal securities

legislation. 6
1 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958).
2 The Rule is called into play only where the proscribed deed is perpetrated
"directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange .... The
proscriptions of the Rule are embodied in three sub-paragraphs which respectively make
it "unlawful": "(I) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or (2) to make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949).
3 See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); McClure v. Borne
Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); Connelly v.
Balkwill, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953);
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Corp., 69 F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
4 See, e.g., the reference in Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
to the ". . . rather muddied state of the law with respect to the elements of a claim
under... Rule lOb-5 .... " Id. at 774.
5 This comment will not focus directly on the other clauses of lOb-5, or on the
problem of complete non-disclosure. See notes 9, 11 & 13 infra.
6 Within a short time before this comment went to press, several student treatments
of the topic appeared. Comment, 74 YALE L.J. 658 (1965); Note, 63 MICH. L. Rav. 1070
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There are three basic types of conduct on the part of a buyer or
seller of securities which fall within the ambit of lOb-5. First, affirmative
misrepresentation: the defendant makes a statement of material fact
which is false.7 Second, half-truths: the defendant makes a number of
statements which are themselves true, but he omits a material fact or
facts so that the true statements in context are misleading.8 Third,
complete omission: the defendant makes no representations of material
fact, but omits to state facts which would influence the plaintiff in
his actions.9
(1965). (The latter is essentially an expanded case note on Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964); see text accompanying note 48 infra.)
7 Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939), aff'd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940), held that a representation that a corporation's affairs were
being managed by someone who was not the true manager constituted a material misrepresentation under the similar language of section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.
See note 26 infra. Compare United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1962)
(criminal prosecution under 17(a) of the 1933 Act, see note 26 infra), involving false
representations to investors that the U.S. Navy and several large firms had made substantial bids for the defendant's invention.
8 See, e.g., Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14
(W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on fact issue sub nom. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v.
Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962), where defendant, in reselling municipal bonds to
plaintiff, allegedly did not tell buyer that the bonds had been issued on credit by the
municipality, and that the resultant obligation on the note was payable by return of
the outstanding bonds in lieu of cash; Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210
(9th Cir. 1962), where defendant-seller allegedly omitted mention of outstanding
mortgages on corporate property in his estimation of profits and rate of return to
plaintiff-buyer.
9 See, e.g., In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), where a seller of securities
on the open market made no mention of material inside information which had come
to his attention and which assured the subsequent decrease in value of the stock sold.
Although Cady, Roberts was not a private action, the fact situation presents a striking
illustration of the potential scope of the prohibitions involved. See generally, Comment,
Insider Liability Under Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CmI. L. RiEv. 121 (1962). This comment will not treat the different problems
of fact and interpretation raised by the question of complete omission. It should be
noted, however, that liability under lOb-5 for complete silence, or non-disclosure, will
depend on the court's view of what circumstances impose a duty to speak: "[T]he duty
to speak which is implicit in Rule X-10B-5 arises in those circumstances where a
fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relation exists, where confidence is reposed or influence
acquired, where there is a justifiable expectancy of disclosure or reliance upon the
superior knowledge of another and in like circumstances." Connelly v. Balkwill,
174 F. Supp. 49, 59 (N.D. Ohio 1959), afl'd, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960). The
doctrine was phrased somewhat differently in Cady, Roberts, supra at 912:
"Analytically, the obligation to disclose rests on two principal elements; first, the
existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended
to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing." See
generally Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations
by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185 (1964); Joseph, Civil
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Unfortunately, these separate types of conduct do not fall neatly
within the separate sections of the Rule, for there is considerable overlap if the language of each sub-section is taken literally. Thus, there is
a question whether a defendant who has either made an affirmative misrepresentation or spoken a half-truth, both of which dearly fall within
clause (2), may nevertheless be sued under clause (3).10
This ambiguity is significant because the clauses suggest varying substantive requirements. Clause (1), by use of the phrase "to defraud,"
implies a requirement of intent, 1 whereas clause (2) implies no such
requirement, and the language of clause (3) ("would operate as a
fraud") emphasizes the effect of the conduct rather than the actor's state
of mind. While a misrepresentation, either by way of complete falsehood or half-truth, arguably constitutes an "act" or "practice" which
may "operate as a fraud" upon the plaintiff within the language of clause
(3),12 with whatever easing of proof may follow, such a construction
would in effect make clause (2) mere surplusage. Yet because clause (2)
is the most detailed of the three clauses in its description of the type
of conduct proscribed it should be the principal enforcement clause
for such conduct. Clause (3) in this scheme should relate primarily to
complete non-disclosures 13 as its language "operates or would operate"
Liability Under Rule lOb-5-A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 171 (1964); Ruder, Civil
Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv.
627 (1963); Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close
Corporation Under the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 505 (1953); Note, 42
VA. L. RFv. 537, 546-64 (1956); Note, 40 MINN. L. REv. 62 (1955); Note, 14 U. CH. L.
REv. 471 (1947).
10 The same problem is present with regard to section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, the
sub-clauses of which are nearly parallel to those of lOb-5. See, e.g., United States v.
Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1962) (reversing conviction on other grounds), where
affirmative misrepresentations were deemed part of a "scheme to defraud" under clause
17a(1).
11 Cf. Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1958), which bars certain employer actions "to encourage
or discourage" union membership, and which has been construed to demand intent or
motivation on the employer's part. See e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177
(1941). But see Comment, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 124, 127-31 (1964).
12 See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). See note 14
infra.
13 At least one court has suggested that "silence cannot be deemed to be the employment of 'any device, scheme or artifice' contemplated by the interdiction of . . .
[clause (1)]." Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952). Clause (3), however, has been construed
as sufficiently broad to encompass complete silence where the so-called "insider's duty
to disclose" is violated. See note 9 supra; see also Comment, 32 TExAs L. REV. 197, 200
(1953).
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suggests. Granted the importance of these distinctions for proper imple14
mentation of the Rule, however, few courts have drawn them.
Clause (2) should, therefore, govern lOb-5 actions based on affirmative
misrepresentations or half-truths. The problem then becomes whether
the plaintiff may recover simply on proof that the misleading statement
was made or whether he must establish some degree of fault on the
defendant's part. The three basic alternatives are: 15 (1) absolute liability
-the fact that the statements made were false or misleading is sufficient
to establish liability regardless of the defendant's state of mind; (2)
intentional liability-the false or misleading statements must have been
made knowingly or with intent to mislead; (3) negligence liability-the
defendant will not be liable if he was unaware of the deception and
could not have cured it by the exercise of reasonable care. 16
14 This distinction will have no practical consequences as long as the courts view the
Rule as a whole. In Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), for
example, the court ruled that defendants' failure to disclose to the seller-plaintiffs the
corporation's increased earnings and inventory valuations before purchasing plaintiffs'
stock violated all three clauses. The court styled the defendants' failure to disclose as an
"implied misrepresentation" constituting "an untrue statement of a material fact
within the meaning of the governing rule." The defendants, however, had apparently
made certain material statements to the plaintiffs to induce the sale, so that the offense
was a half-truth, clearly within the ambit of clause (2). There was, therefore, no need
for the court's characterization of the omission as an "implied misrepresentation."
Also, plaintiffs had established the defendants' intent to defraud. Thus the opinion
seems more the result of an abundance of resources than keen analysis. See also List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965), where the court conceded that
complete silence may not violate clauses (I) or (2) but went on to say: "[WV]e fail to see
that it makes any difference which clause of Rule lOb-5 is relied on by plaintiff, and
no reason for requiring a choice here has been pointed out to us." (Emphasis added.)
Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964), exemplifies a
more discerning approach by suggesting that where complete non-disclosure is the
crux of the alleged offense, the plaintiff's claim cannot be based on clause (2), some
affirmative statement being required by that clause. Accord, Cochran v. Channing Corp.,
211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907, 913 nn.19 & 20 (1961). This comment will proceed on the assumption that the
clauses should stand alone and encompass generally different spheres of conduct.
15 These formulations are not intended to be exhaustive but rather to indicate the
general directions of interpretation possible along a continuum ranging from complete
subjective innocence to utter subjective intent. Thus, for instance, characterizations
such as "reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the statements made" or "constructive knowledge based on the totality of defendant's action" might be included either
under negligent or intentional liability. But see Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd.,
supra note 14. A recent student comment on this problem distinguished only two broad
alternatives reflecting this continuum-scienter-negigence and absolute liability-and
opted for the former. Note, 63 MICH. L. Rav. 1070 (1965).
16 All three alternatives involve reasonable constructions of clause (2). Clearly, absolute liability would be in accord with the language of the clause, which makes no
mention of knowledge or intent. On the other hand, the right of action involved is a
creature of judicial inference, and the courts may define it by reading into the action
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Since nothing in the history of lOb-5 illuminates the problem of what
substantive elements must be proven, both the general objectives of
federal securities legislation, especially as reflected in those provisions
of section 12(2) of the 1933 Act which closely parallels the language of
1Ob-5(2), and the common law background should be highly relevant
in determining the proper interpretation of the Rule. Although no evidence exists that Congress ever considered a private action under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act, 17 the implication of a civil right of action does
not depend so much on the existence of affirmative evidence of congressional intent as it does on the absence of evidence that Congress did not
so intend. 8 Thus, while the basis for an implied action is firm, as a
matter of judicial doctrine, "legislative intent" as applied to the elements
of the lOb-5 action is somewhat fictive. Hence the whole pattern of
relevant securities law must be considered and as the Supreme Court
has recently indicated, "Congress intended . . . securities legislation

'enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds' [to be construed] not technically and restrictively but rather flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes."' 9
elements not expressly contained in the language of the Rule, such as negligence or
scienter limitations, in accord with their notion of legislative intent. The courts have
professed to undertake such a process of implication, e.g., with section 8(a)(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act. See note 11 supra.
See, e.g., Joseph, supra note 9, at 174; 74 YALE L.J. 658, 660 (1965); III Loss,
1757-59 (2d ed. 1961).
18 "Implied rights of action are not contingent upon statutory language which
affirmatively indicate that they are intended. On the contrary, they are implied unless
the legislation evidences a contrary intention." Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 224
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961) (implying a civil right of action under
section 37 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940). This view is generally applied to
the "tort theory" of implied liability, which proceeds on the principle that where a
statute is enacted for the protection of a given class of persons, a member of that class
may recover for injuries received as a result of violation of the enactment. The
principle is embodied in section 286 of the Restatement of Torts, which has been
recognized as an authoritative formulation of the rationale in most jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc,. 229 F. Supp. 33, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Trussell
v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964); Brown v. Bullock, supra;
Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949). The tort theory was
recognized by the Supreme Court in Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
Where privity of contract is present, however, the plaintiff apparently is able to base
his right of action on section 29(b) of the 1934 Act, which provides that all contracts
made "in violation" of any provision of the Act shall be voidable as to the rights of
the violator. While this "contract theory" says nothing about the substantive misconduct
which may constitute a violation of Rule lOb-5, it at least avoids the "willffilness"
issued raised by section 32 and the "tort theory." See text accompanying notes 55-62
infra. But see Crist v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 343 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1965), where a
contract theory of recovery was denied despite the presence of privity and the rescission
remedy sought. "The origin of this cause of action shows it is in tort." Id. at 904.
19 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963), construing a
17
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Briefly, the federal securities legislation was designed to protect the
2
investor,20 maintain integrity and honesty in the securities market, '
and curb "unnecessary, unwise, and destructive speculation." 22 *Where
Congress expressly created civil liabilities to implement these policies,
two aims predominated: to compensate the innocent investor who had
lost money on falsely valued securities and to deter the proscribed practices by effective civil sanctions which complemented injunctive and
criminal remedies.2 3 But Congress was not unmindful of the necessity
section of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 847 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2))
which is almost identical to lOb-5(3), to be a proper basis for injunctive action against
the defendant investment adviser's undisclosed "scalping" practices, although no intent
to injure clients or actual injury had been established. Cf. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943).
20 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934): "As a complex society
so diffuses and differentiates the financial interests of the ordinary citizen that he has
to trust others and cannot personally watch the managers of all his interests as one
horse trader watches another, it becomes a condition of the very stability of that society
that its rules of law and of business practice recognize and protect that ordinary citizen's
dependent position." See also 78 CONG. REC. 8040 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Rayburn); 78
CONG. Rac. 7717 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Ford); 78 CONG. RKc. 7861 (1934) (remarks of
Rep. Lea-co-author of the House bill). Cf. 78 CONG. RFc. 7865 (1934) (remarks of Rep.
Wolverton--co-author of the House bill). For a sweeping judicial view of this aim, see
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1965) (dictum): "ETihe policy
of the federal securities laws is to protect investors, including the uninformed, the ignorant and the gullible." Id. at 602. That such a view is overly broad is at least suggested
by the remarks of Rep. Rayburn-co-sponsor of the 1933 Act-on the House floor: "Let
me repeat that what we seek to attain by this enactment is to make available to the
prospective purchaser, if he is wise enough to use it, all information that is pertinent
that would put him on notice and on guard, and then let him beware." 77 CONG. REC.
2916 (1933)." (Emphasis added.)
21 Or, as it was expressed in the House Committee Report, "The bill seeks to give
to investors markets where prices may be established by free and honest balancing of
investment demand with investment supply." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
10 (1934). The Report also spoke in terms of an "extension of the legal conception of a
fiduciary relationship-a guarantee of 'straight shooting'--[to support] ... the constant
extension of mutual confidence." Id. at 5.
22 H.R. KRE'. No. 1383, supra note 21, at 2. Note the Committee's reference to the
Presidential Message of February 9, 1934, wherein President Roosevelt condemned the
fact that "outside the field of legitimate investment naked speculation has been made
far too alluring and far too easy for those who could and those who could not afford
to gamble." Id. at 1. See also S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934); 78 CONG. KEc.
7689 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Sabath); 78 CONG. KRc. 7717 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Ford).
All three broad goals may be viewed as summed up implicitly in Representative Raybum's comments about the 1933 Act: "The purpose of this bill is to place owners of
securities on a parity, so far as is possible, with the management of the corporations
and to place the buyer on the same place so far as available information is concerned,
with the seller." 77 CONG. Ruc. 2918 (1933).
23 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934): "Experience with State
laws designed to prevent the exploitation of the investor . . . has demonstrated the
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to avoid as far as possible any undue interference with honest business
24
activity in the securities market.
A particular source of legislative policy relevant to lOb-5 finds expression in section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.25 The language of that
section, strikingly similar to clause (2) of lOb-5, proscribes false or mis26
leading statements made in connection with the sale of securities.
Unlike lOb-5, however, section 12(2) creates a civil right of action only
in favor of purchasers of stock. Moreover, the section 12(2) action is
governed by expressly delineated substantive and procedural elements:
for example, buyers alone can sue under the section, 27 plaintiff and defendant must be in privity,2 8 the defendant-seller is liable for negligent as
inadequacy of criminal penalties as the sole sanction. Customers are ordinarily
reluctant to resort to criminal proceedings, and in the absence of complaints by them,
the discovery of violations is often impossible. Furthermore, if an investor has suffered
loss by reason of illicit practices, it is equitable that he should be allowed to recover
damages from the guilty party." See also H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1934); 78 CONG. REc. 7862 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Lea); 78 CONG. Rc. 8040 (1934)
(remarks of Rep. Rayburn); 78 CONG. REc. 8088 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Mapes). The
dvil liabilities provisions of the 1933 Act, notably section 12(2), reflect the same twofold approach of compensation and deterrence. See S. RaP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933).
24 See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934); 78 CONG. REc. 7934 (1934)
(remarks of Rep. Kenney); 78 CONG. REc. 8200, 10185-86 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Byrnes).
25 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 771(2) (1958).
26 Section 12(2)'s prohibition covers "any person who offers or sells a security ....
by the use of any means or instrumentality of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication,
which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
The language of section 17a(2) of
under which they were made, not misleading ....
the 1933 Act (48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 77q(a)(2) (1958)) is almost identical to 12(2)
and lOb-5(2). In fact, lob-5 was avowedly aimed at plugging the loophole in 17a,
which applies only to seller practices. SEC ANN. REP. 10 (1942). Whether section 17, a
criminal provision, can serve as a basis for implied liability as does lob-5 is apparently
still an open question. While several cases have held that it could so serve, Dack v.
Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), these cases involve no discussion of the reasons for such implication.
Rather, they seem to assume that 17a should be treated the same as lob-5. However,
the arguments against implication from section 17 seem much stronger than those
involving lob-5. See III Loss, SEcUrITIEs REGULATION 1784-87 (2d ed. 1961).
It has recently been advanced that section 12(2) provides a civil remedy for violation of 17a(2), which therefore cannot be an independent source of civil liability.
Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 766-67 (D. Colo. 1964).
27 The only potential defendant is one who "offers or sells a security." 48 Stat. 74
(1933), 15 U.S.C. 771(2) (1958). But note section 15, which makes "controlling persons"
liable to the same extent as the "controlled" seller, subject to a defense of "no
knowledge of, or reasonable grounds to believe in" the liability-creating facts. 48 Stat.
74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 77o (1958).
28 ".... shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him." 48 Stat. 74
(1933), 15 U.S.C. 771(2) (1958). See note 27 supra.
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well as knowing mis-statements, 29 and the buyer need not prove his reliance on the mis-statement. 30 The statute of limitation provides further
restrictions by barring suits brought one year after the mis-statement was
31
or should have been discovered, or in any case three years after the sale.
Also, a plaintiff has a liberal venue option, 32 but he may be required
33
to post a security bond.
While the proscriptive language of lOb-5(2) and section 12(2) is nearly
identical, lOb-5(2) fails to specify the substantive and procedural elements of an action thereunder. The worry has been that any reading of
lOb-5(2) more liberal than 12(2) for buyer-plaintiffs will effectively nullify
the latter section. Yet to import the section 12(2) elements into lOb-5
seems utterly arbitrary in the way it would affect seller-plaintiffs: nor
would a differentiation between buyer and seller which either precludes
the former from suit or imports the section 12(2) elements as to him
be acceptable, since lOb-5 on its face makes no such discrimination
between buyer and seller. The dilemma posed for the courts is that to
imply a buyer's civil action under lOb-5(2) in the face of the pre-existing
detailed expression of congressional concern in section 12(2) is either
to limit the effectiveness of section 12(2) by creating a possibly more
attractive alternative remedy, thereby ignoring express congressional
intent, or to thwart whatever intent is discernible in 1Ob-5 by importing
artificial distinctions or requirements into it. The obvious solution would
be to recognize the anomaly and either refuse to imply a buyer's civil
action under lOb-5(2)34 or imply a buyer's action and delineate it by
systematic analysis of relevant policies. The courts, with few exceptions, 35
29 L.e., he is liable unless he can prove that "he did not know, and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission." 48 Stat. 74
(1933), 15 U.S.C. 771(2) (1958).
30 Plaintiff need only establish that he did not know, in fact, of the omission. Ibid.
See Murphy v. Cady, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1940).
31 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 77m (1958).
32 He may sue in ". . . the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant
or transacts business, or in the district where the offer or sale took place, if the
defendant participates therein." 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 77v(a) (1958).
33 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 77k(3) (1958). This threat, discretionary
with the court, is neither idle nor de minimis. See, e.g., Dabney v. Alleghany Corp., 164
F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 933,
936 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (both cases involved the imposition of a $15,000 bond).
34 See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
35 See Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948), where the
buyer-plaintiff alleged misconduct clearly cognizable under the 1933 Act, and the court
held the plaintiff's sole remedy was under that section. "No other interpretation can
avoid making a completely incongruous piece of legislation out of the two statutes in
question." Id. at 125. Accord, Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 933
(S.D.N.Y. 1948). These two cases remain as the sole examples to date of a court's refusal
to allow a buyer to sue under lob-5 because of the express right of action in the 1933
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have rejected the first solution, but none have proceeded to the second
analysis.
In addition to the over-all goals of securities regulation, the pervasive
influence of common law and equity principles should be kept in mind.
The concepts involved in the lOb-5(2) suit, such as misrepresentation,
negligence, and scienter, all come laden with their own common law
connotations and "courts generally interpret statutes in the context of
3 6

the common law."

Act. While Rosenberg's conclusion has been rejected, explicitly or implicitly, by most
courts, the reasoning that the two statutes should be read as internally consistent still
commands judicial attention. See, e.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783
(2d Cir. 1951); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
But see Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp., 201 F. Supp. 466 (D. Del. 1962). See text
accompanying note 48 infra.
36 Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1962), in which it
was held that the traditional defenses of estoppel, waiver and laches are available in a
10b-5 action. Cf. Straley v. Universal Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370 (9th Cir.
1961), holding that estoppel and waiver were available defenses in actions under the
civil liabilities provision of the 1933 Act. It is submitted, however, that primary
emphasis should not be placed on the common law. The argument for looking
initially to the common law as an "analogue" for delineating lOb-5 is based (a) on the
assumption that Congress and the SEC must have intended that terms such as "fraud"
be interpreted in light of the common law, and (b) on the necessity for uniform
development and application of the Rule. 74 YALE L.J. 658, 666 (1965). Such an
approach seems inconsistent, however, when it is realized that the substantive meaning
of a term like "fraud" or the elements of a deceit action vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. See 74 YALE L.J. 658, 670-71, 683 & n.95 (1965). Such substantive divergence
may readily be observed in the varying state approaches to a "duty of disclosure" rule,
embodied in at least three characterizations--"majority," "minority" and "special facts"
doctrines. See generally Comment, 30 U. Cm. L. Rsv. 121 (1962); Note, 42 VA. L REv.
537 (1956). To the extent that the substantive elements of a lOb-5(2) action would
depend on the application of differing state common law formulations, the desired
goal of uniformity would be hampered, not aided. Cf. McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292
F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961): "[S]tate law will only control where that law will not cut across
the federal interests receiving expression in the federal right sought to be enforced....
It can be said fairly that the Securities Exchange Act, of which Sections 10(b) and 29(b)
art- parts, constitutes far reaching federal substantive corporation law." Id. at 834.
Moreover, this assumption that congressional and administrative silence indicates an
intent to use terms with their common law connotations, if carried to its logical end,
would seem to preclude reference to broad policy goals inherent in securities legislation
taken as a whole, at least where such goals conflict with common law principles. It
seems more reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to vest authority in the
SEC to delineate the broad terms "manipulative and deceptive," with primary reference
to the broad policy goals of the legislation. The legislative history of the 1934 Act
indicates that Congress intended to vest the SEC with "broad discretionary powers"
to implement the policies of the Act. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1934); S.R P. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934); 78 CONG. REc.8113 (1934) (remarks
of Rep. Rayburn). For judicial rejection of the contention that the grant of power in
10(b) should be restrictively viewed, see Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (1961). See
generally, I DAvis, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW TREATisE §§ 2.01-2.16 (1958). Therefore, overall
legislative policy rather than the common law should be the initial reference point.
This, of course, should not preclude attempts to harmonize the resultant formulation

MISREPRESENTATIONS UNDER RULE lOb-5

ABSOLUTE LIABILITY

Clause (2) does not mention knowledge or intent. On its face, the
clause prohibits the bare making of a mis-statement. The first approach
which it suggests, then, is absolute liability. Such an approach would
compensate the investor who has lost money on falsely valued securities,
one of the prime purposes of the "anti-fraud" provisions. 7 Thus, it
seems reasonable to conclude, as has one district court, 38 that the defendant's state of mind is immaterial, for "the results are the same" to the
plaintiff whether or not the defendant knew of the misrepresentation and
intended to profit from it. Further, where plaintiff and defendant are in

privity, recovery by the plaintiff results in a restoration of the status quo
ante. Indeed, in many jurisdictions, it is accepted equity doctrine that innocent misrepresentations of material fact by a vendor, relied upon to the
detriment of his vendee, can negate the transaction and support the

vendee's action for damages.39 This doctrine, however, has not extended
to statements which are not false in themselves but are merely misleading
in context. Since lOb-5(2) includes misleading as well as false statements,
reasoning by analogy to the common law appears unsatisfactory, although
when privity exists and false statements are at issue the absolute liability
approach may be harmonious with the common law.
Where plaintiff and defendant are not in privity, questions of restoring
a status quo ante or of correcting the defendant's wrongful retention of
plaintiff's money do not necessarily arise. Absolute liability may be justified as compensating injured plaintiffs.4 0 However, since most people
with one or more common law doctrines as assayed, e.g., in 74 YAE LEJ. 658 (1965) and
30 U. CHI. L. REv. 121 (1962), nor should it preclude reference to traditional legal and

equitable principles where legislative policy does not point in a discernible direction.
See, e.g., Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, supra. But see McClure v. Borne Chemical
Co., supra (although there is no clear legislative policy favoring or condemning the
requirement of a security bond under lOb-5, state statutes demanding such a requirement are not applicable).
37 See note 23 supra.
38 Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky.
1960), rev'd on fact issue sub nom. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d
242 (6th Cir. 1962).
39 See, e.g., Stein v. Treger, 182 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ("One may honestly make a
false representation, believing it to be true, but if made as a statement of fact, it is
false and fraudulent." Id. at 698-99); Nocatee Fruit Co. v. Fosgate, 12 F.2d 250 (5th Cir.
1926) ("The affirmation of what one does not know or believe to be true is equally in
morals and law as unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known to be positively
false. And even if a party innocently misrepresents a fact by mistake, it is equally
conclusive, because it operates as a surprise and imposition on the other party, and
misleads the parties contracting, on the subject of the contract." Id. at 252.) See
generally WVILSTON, CONTRACTS § 1500 (1936).
40 It is assumed that the deterrent factor of civil liability is inapplicable where, by
hypothesis, the conduct involved is inadvertent. Thus, from the viewpoint of legislative
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who buy and sell stocks are investors, the defendants as well as the plaintiffs probably will be investors whom the securities legislation is intended
to protect. The absolute liability approach would result, therefore, in
the compensation of innocent investors by innocent investors. 41 Moreover, absent privity, equity and common law principles run counter to
the absolute liability approach; a loss is generally not shifted in the
absence of causative "fault," which is lacking here by hypothesis. 42 There
is also a serious question regarding the effects an absolute liability
approach would have on the general field of securities transactions. Such
an approach at worst would encourage speculation and at best emasculate the principle of finality of agreement. Investors could transact with
the thought that if the stock were not to fare well, some prior inadvertent
mis-statement or omission by the other party to the contract might be
unearthed, and the sale rescinded or damages paid. 43 There would also
be an in terrorem effect on the conscientious investor; the only sure way
to be secure from the threat of future suits by unscrupulous or disgruntled buyers or sellers would be to refrain from investing at all. 44
policy, absolute liability must rest solely on its compensatory objectives. See note 23
supra.
41 A notable exception occurs where the defendant is an issuer of securities. Absolute
liability here would not result in such an anomaly-in fact, faultless liability would
appear to be in accord with the policy of section lib of the 1933 Act, which leaves' the
issuer (as distinguished, e.g., from a director or accountant) no defense of good faith
and reasonable investigation once a registration statement is shown to have been
false or misleading. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 77k(b) (1958). Given that
the same conduct may be actionable under Section 11 and Rule lOb-5, it is arguable
that an extra proof burden on the plaintiff under the latter would defeat the purpose
of the former. The argument is of little moment, however, since the plaintiff may still
utilize section 11. This is not to say that the issuer-defendant under iOb-5 may not
be under a higher duty than the investor-defendant. To the extent that an issuer may
be held to a greater duty of care vis-i-vis the plaintiff under lOb-5(2), the broad policy
in section 11 will not be neglected. See discussion of negligence liability in text
accompanying notes 62-77 infra.
42 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw, 77-82, 88-96 (1881). It should be noted of course
that the fault principle in the field of torts is not absolute in its operation. The courts
have carved out exceptions to this principle, e.g., in so-called "dangerous instrumentality" situations, Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3, H.L. 330 (1868), or in the area of
defamation, imposing in these areas absolute liability. The fact that the common law
generally demands the demonstration of fault before shifting a loss is thus not
necessarily determinative of the question at hand. Nevertheless, it can be confidently
stated that even if absolute liability under clause (2) is rejected purely for practical
reasons, such rejection is entirely in accord with generally accepted common law tort
principles. See 74 YALE LJ. 658, 689-90 & n.118 (1965).
43 Such encouragement of speculation would run counter to one of the objectives
of the 1934 Act. See note 22 supra. Moreover, even conceding that Congress did not
intend to condemn a given form of speculation is not tantamount to finding a
congressional policy of encouragement.
44 This is the suggestion of the SEC regarding those with access to inside information
of a corporation. A party with inside information who wishes to avoid civil liability
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Thus, the absolute liability approach could well foster excessive speculation in the market by insuring the speculator against ordinary investment losses or, conversely, place an unhealthy restriction on the volume
of securities transactions by imposing onerous burdens on good-faith
investors. Whatever theoretical arguments may appear to favor absolute
liability pale in the face of the serious practical consequences such a
policy forebodes. Such an approach would retard, rather than effectu45
ate, the goals of securities regulation.
INTENTIONAL LIABILITY

The most serious argument which will have to be met by the plaintiff
seeking a broad interpretation of lOb-5(2) is that some form of intent
to misrepresent must be proven. Such an approach draws some strength
from common law principles in that proof of scienter is generally required
in an action for deceit.4 6 Moreover, the overall goals and policies of
securities legislation would apparently not be hindered by such an
approach, nor would specific liability provisions of the 1933 Act be
contradicted.
However, the strongest arguments for an intent standard derive not
from these factors but from the desire not to nullify section 12(2) judicially and from the tort theory of implication. Some courts have feared
that if recovery is allowed to a buyer under lOb-5(2) on the basis of
47
negligent mis-statements, section 12(2) would become, in effect, a nullity.

may choose either to disclose fully that information to the other party to the transaction
or to refrain completely from dealing in that corporation's securities. See In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). Under the absolute liability approach, even this
very limited "choice" is not open to the investor, since he is by hypothesis not privy
to any inside information and thus has no advance notice of what securities in which
he should refrain from trading.
45 Apart from the suggestion of the district court in Texas Continental Life Ins.
Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (V.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on fact issue sub nom.
Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962), that even an
honest mistake will subject a defendant to civil liability under 10b-5, no court has held
that liability will attach under lOb-5 for non-negligent misrepresentations, although
the language of the courts is often far from clear. See, e.g., Royal Air Properties, Inc. v.
Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962); Dack v. Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y.
1964). Professor Loss suggests that the congressional delegation of power in section 10(b)
is, by its terms, restricted to violations involving some form of knowledge or intent,
as suggested by the words "manipulative or deceptive." III Loss, SECURmTIES REGULATION
1767 (2d ed. 1961). See Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo.
1964). Contra, Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961).
46 Such proof does not always entail demonstration of actual knowledge by the
defendant. See, e.g., the broad alternate definitions of scienter in Boysen v. Petersen,
203 Ia. 1073, 211 N.V. 894 (1927) ("Scienter is now concededly held to have a broader
meaning than actual knowledge of falsity.'); WLLIsroN, CONTRACTs § 1509 (1936). See
note 15 supra.
47 See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Trussell v. United
Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
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One escape which the courts have sought from the Scylla of nullifying
section 12(2) and the Charbydis of judicially rewriting lOb-5 by reading
the procedural requirements of section 12(2) into it is to "balance" the
advantages and disadvantages 48 in the 12(2) action and construe congressional intent to demand that the given advantages of the 12(2) action
be extended to the buyer suing under lOb-5(2) only where they are
accompanied or balanced by relevant disadvantages. Since the disadvantages (generally the procedural provisions) of the section 12(2) action
cannot be read into the lOb-5(2) action, 49 this approach argues that the
buyer cannot sue under the 1934 Act unless a new balance is struck,
and new disadvantages are added to his action by way of an increased
burden of proof of such substantive elements as scienter or reliance. It
should be noted that because the balancing approach would not apply
to seller-plaintiffs, who have no section 12(2) right of action, there is
inherent in this scheme the possibility of making recovery under lOb-5
easier for seller-plaintiffs than for buyer-plaintiffs. Yet the plain language
of the Rule calls for no such discrimination.
The central problem with the balancing approach is that there appear
scant rational grounds for assigning relative weights to the particular
elements balanced. Crudely stated, the balancing approach produces the
equation: venue plus security for costs plus statute of limitations equal
burden of proof of scienter and reliance. Who can tell whether the
scienter or reliance element alone is sufficient to balance the removal
of the procedural restrictions? The result under this quasi-algebraic
exercise seems, therefore, somewhat arbitrary. But the concern this
approach expresses with allowing the. buyer's section 12(2) remedy to
remain in effect as a practical implementation of the will of Congress
seems wise. Obviously, if lOb-5(2) is construed to parallel exactly the
48 See notes 25-34 supra, and accompanying text.
49 The reasons for not imposing the restrictions of the section
12(2) action on the
lOb-5(2) proceedings may be summarized as follows: Venue-section 27 of the 1934
Act
establishes venue provisions governing all actions brought under the 1934 Act. 48
Stat.
881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1958); Statute of Limitations-where the 1934 Act provides
any statutes of limitation, they refer to particular sections of the bill. There
is
general or catch-all statute of limitations in the bill. And, since no limitation period no
is
prescribed in Rule lob-5 itself, the applicable statute for actions at law -under
lOb-5
has been held to be that of the forum state. See, e.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d
627
(9th Cir. 1953); Premier Indus., Inc. v. Delaware Valley Fin. Corp., 185 F. Supp.
694
(E.D. Pa. 1960); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp.
954
(N.D. Ill. 1952); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Where the
action
is of an equitable nature, the federal equity principle of laches will be applicable.
Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962). Cf. Holmberg
v.
Arbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); Undertaking for Costs-the 1934 Act has no catch-all
requirement applicable to all actions and section 10(b) does not mention such
a
requirement. See McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3rd Cir. 1961).
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remedy given the buyer in section 12(2) without the latter's more restrictive procedural provisions, the 1933 civil remedy is effectively nullified,
for no buyer-plaintiff would utilize it. This would mean the courts prefer
an implied to an express statutory remedy-an impossible conclusion.
Since this judicial nullification is to be avoided, the validity of balancing
lies in its suggestion that the lOb-5 civil action must differ somehow
from the 12(2) action.
In Ellis v. Carter5O the Ninth Circuit rejected the balancing approach
because the plain wording of section 10(b) and the Rule, referring to
the "purchase or sale" of securities, demands that buyers and sellers be
treated equally. This reasoning appears correct. Since that court rejected
a scienter standard for lOb-5, 51 the danger of nullifying 12(2) was readily
apparent. But the court thought the beneficial results of its decision
justified the danger. Weight would be given to the apparently dominant
policy of Congress "to provide complete and effective sanctions, public
and private, in respect to duties and obligations imposed under the
two acts," and no procedural distinctions between buyer and seller
would be made, "no reason appearing why Congress would have wanted
the procedures to be different." This approach also avoids the Charbydis
of judicially rewriting the 1934 Act and permits the most recent enact-

ment to

govern.

52

The second argument for the intentional liability standard derives from
the tort theory by which civil liability is inferred when no privity between
plaintiff and defendant exists. 53 Under this theory only the violation

of a criminal statute creates civil liability in the violator. But lOb-5 is
not itself a criminal enactment; violation of the Rule, like violation of
any section of the 1934 Act, becomes criminal only when the violation
is willful, as provided by section 32. 5 4 Since a plaintiff must establish
a criminal violation to support private recovery, therefore, he must
establish the defendant's "willfulness." This was the position taken by
Judge Lumbard in his concurring opinion in Spirt v. Bechtel,55 where
the plaintiff unsuccessfully tried to hold the defendant civilly liable
50 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). See also Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th
Cir. 1960).
51 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961).
52 In effect, the Ninth Circuit was echoing Professor Loss's comment on the nature
of the securities acts, viz. that our system of federal securities regulation "after all is
not an integrated code adopted at a single sitting, however one may try to construe it
so." III Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1790 (2d ed. 1961).
53 See note 17 supra. The tort theory may also be utilized where privity exists, but
in such a situation the contract theory based on section 29(b) of the 1934 Act eliminates
the "willfulness" problem.
54 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78ff (1958).
55 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956).
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for violation of the Merchant Marine Act. The provision involved, like
section 10(b), did not mention civil or criminal liability, but another
section of the Act, analogous to section 32 of the 1934 Act, provided
that willful violation of the substantive section was criminally punishable. Judge Lumbard argued that "since the acts here are only criminal
if they were 'willfully' performed and it is doubtful that there was any
willfulness, there should be neither criminal nor civil responsibility." 56
However, as Judge Frank pointed out in dissent, the term "willful" is
subject to numerous constructions of varying degrees of severity. Indeed
the Supreme Court5 7 has indicated several interpretations of "willful,"
as used in criminal statutes, any one of which might be proper depending on "the context in which it is used." 58 These include acts done
". without justifiable excuse, . . .stubbornly, obstinately, perversely
..
without ground for believing it is lawful . . .or conduct marked
by careless disregard whether or not one has the right so to act." 59
Where a defendant has made a statement, the misleading quality or
falsity of which was unknown to him but which could have been ascertained by the exercise of some care, his failure to verify the statements
might be characterized as a "careless disregard" of the listener. Thus
under appropriate circumstances, willfulness might be simply an alternative way of describing a negligence standard.6 0 When circumstances
are appropriate should depend on the policies of the securities legislation. Decisions in this area are unclear due to the practice of framing
56 Id. at 251.
57 United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
58 Id. at 395.
59 Id. at 394-95 (citations omitted).
60 Generally, a broad construction of securities legislation is preferred to a narrower
one where a choice is presented. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180 (1963); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 353-55 (1943). Moreover, the
courts' past treatment of a willfulness requirement, for instance in broker license
revocation actions under the 1934 Act, suggests that this element is not to be construed
rigorously. See, e.g., Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965) (" '[W]illfully' ... means
intentionally committing the act which constitutes the violation. There is no requirement that the actor also be aware that he is violating one of the Rules or Acts.");
Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (defendant's refusal to cease certain
practices at the request of the SEC satisfied the "willful" requirement in spite of her
assumedly bona fide belief that her conduct was lawful); Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v.
SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ("willful" element satisfied by "conscious, knowing
and purposeful course of action'). Cf. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863
(2d Cir. 1964); Dennis v. United States, 171 F.2d 986, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1948); NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227-29 (1963); Stone v. United States, 113 F2d 70, 75
(6th Cir. 1940); United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1962) (criminal
violation of section 17a of 1933 Act upheld despite fact that defendant was unaware
of the falsity of his statements). See also Note, 63 MicH. L. REtv. 1070, 1080 (1965)
(equating the "modern concept of scienter" with negligence).
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complaints in terms of intent. 61 In both the privity and non-privity
cases, therefore, whether an intentional or negligence standard should
obtain must be decided with reference to the policies involved, and not
to the theory of implying liabilities, although, because of the willful
requirement, something more than simple negligence may be required
in the non-privity situation. This comment seeks to define a negligence
standard which should satisfy this requirement.
NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY

While absolute liability advances the compensatory objectives of the
Act, its use might unduly hamper legitimate business activity in the
securities field because of the possibility of frivolous suits in fluctuating
market periods. On the other hand, while an intent requirement for
liability would probably not thwart the goals of the securities legislation, it would also not further those goals effectively. It is the thesis of
this comment that a negligence standard best effectuates these goalsprotection of the investor, maintaining open and honest dealing, and
equalizing access to information between buyer and seller of securities.6 2
Indeed, section 12(2) suggests that a negligence standard for securities
transactions is most compatible with probable congressional intent. Not
only was the legislative choice there made in favor of the less severe
degree of culpability, but by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant Congress imposed a presumption of such culpability against the
defendant. 63 Under section 12(2) recovery is allowed against the seller
unless he can establish "that he did not know and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission." 64
61 Several courts have referred to the necessity of proving "fraud" (Fischman v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951)) or "some form" of scienter (Trussell v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964)) to support recovery, and
have held that this would entail a greater burden of proof than is demanded by
section 12(2). In Trussell, supra, and in Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y.
1955), the courts clearly distinguished between negligent mis-statements, considered not
actionable under lOb-5, and intentional mis-statements. However, in most cases dealing
with lOb-5 actions, the complaints have apparently been framed in terms of intent or
knowledge, probably to be most secure in an uncharted area of law. See Latty, Aggrieved
ShareholdersUnder the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 505, 526 (1953).
02 See note 22 supra (remarks of Rep. Rayburn).
03 The objection has been raised that there is "no rational reason" to look to one
section of the acts over another as a "model" for fashioning the lob-5 remedy. Comment,
74 YALE L.J. 658, 666 (1965). This may be true as regards clauses (1) and (3), to the
extent that their language is not similar to that of any express civil liability provision.
Clause (2) and section 12(2), however, are virtually identical in their description of
activity proscribed. For this reason alone, the legislative approach to misrepresentation
taken in section 12(2) should be applicable to lOb-5(2) misrepresentation actions,
subject to the caveat of the Fischman-Trussell analysis. See text accompanying notes 4851 supra.
64 See note 30 supra.
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Congress's concern in section 12(2) was to place the duty of care on the
party with greater access to relevant information. 65 The purpose of the
shifted burden of proof was to implement the congressional judgment
that sellers were generally in a better position to discover material information about the security involved. 66 While this may be true in the
case of an issuer of a security, once the issue is launched into the market,
the assumption underlying section 12(2)'s one-sided cause of action does
not seem compelling. Thus, the seller of the stock may well be a minority
shareholder and the buyer a majority shareholder or director of the
corporation. In such a case it is clearly unjustifiable to assume that the
seller is better able than the buyer to discover the "prospective earnings
and business plans" of the corporation.6 7 The concern over access to
relevant information as a standard of care would seem applicable to
lOb-5(2), but without the judgment that sellers alone should observe
the standard. Similarly, the burden of proving access should remain on
the plaintiff, since no judgment as to whether buyers or sellers generally
have access can be made.
This congressional concern with placing responsibility on the party
having greater access to material information has been acknowledged in
cases involving complete non-disclosure under lOb-5(3). 68 Liability in such
cases is based on a breach of duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff
-the duty to disclose. Although this obligation has been characterized
as "fiduciary" or "quasi-fiduciary," the duty to disclose under lOb-5(3)
does not depend on the traditionally delineated relationship. Rather,
the obligation can arise in isolated sales transactions between total
strangers, linked only as buyer and seller. 69 The primary factor which
65 See, e.g., remarks of Rep. Rayburn, supra note 22. It has been suggested that the
policy is in fact narrower in that the duty of care (negligence liability) was imposed
only as regards those "statements made in business transactions which yield . . . [the
speaker] economic benefit." Comment, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 686 (1965). As far as section
12(2) is concerned, since privity is required, assumedly every defendant will fit this
category, though even here the effect of section 15 might raise a question as to the
suggested limit. Assuming that the privity restriction, like the buyer-plaintiff restriction, is not to be carried over to lOb-5, the direct applicability of the "economic benefit"
rationale seems unnecessary.
66 See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1933). The Supreme Court
explained the general approach of the 1933 act thusly: "[I]t is clear that the Securities
Act was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers labor. Issuers of
and dealers in securities have better opportunities to investigate and appraise the
prospective earnings and business plans affecting securities than buyers. It is therefore
reasonable for Congress to put buyers of securities covered by that Act on a different
basis from other purchasers." Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953).
67 See note 66 supra.
68 See note 9 supra.
69 Indeed, in In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 707 (1961), the defendant
probably did not see or know the identity of the seller of the stock, since the transaction
occurred on the exchange.
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gives rise to the duty is the unequal access to material information. Thus,
where one party, buyer or seller, is in possession of inside corporate
information to which the other party does not have access, lOb-5(3)
probably requires disclosure. 70 It is not the defendant's position as
insider per se which imposes the duty on him, but rather the possession
of material facts to which the other party has no access. Thus, even
where the defendant is an "insider," such as a director of the corporation,
it has been held that his failure to disclose material facts to the plaintiff
will not lead to liability where the plaintiff himself has the ability and
opportunity to discover those facts easily.71 On the other hand, given
the defendant's possession of inside information to which the plaintiff
does not have access, liability for non-disclosure is possible under clause
(3) even where defendant is not, technically speaking, an insider. 72
Such application of clause (3) clearly illustrates an implicit recognition of the broad congressional goal of equalization of access, reflected
in section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. The duty of disclosure under clause
(3) further operates to preserve the integrity of securities transactions
-a primary aim of federal securities legislation-by promoting candor
in discussion and mutual confidence and respect between the parties to
a transaction. Clearly, speculation is curbed-a further goal of Congress-to the extent that quick turn-overs on the basis of "hot tips" are
discouraged. These policies and arguments apply similarly to lOb-5(2).
The general congressional scheme is apparent and the access to information standard emerges as central to the duty of care under l0b-5(2).
Although section 12(2) does not require proof of reliance-the plaintiff
need show only his own lack of actual knowledge and the fact that the
mis-statement was made-the inclusion of a reasonable reliance element
in lOb-5(2) actions would be desirable, if not necessary. 73 Such an element
70 Such non-disclosure forms the basis for the SEC's complaint against the Texas
Gulf Sulphur Company, soon to be litigated in the Southern District of New York.
N.Y. Times, April 21, 1965, § C, p. 63, col. 4.
71 Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1962).
72 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See note 9 supra.
73 Although, as Professor Loss points out, inclusion of a reliance element is still an
open question, III Loss, SECURrnEs REGULATION 1766 (2d ed. 1961), most courts seem to
have decided, implicitly or explicitly, that reliance is necessary for recovery. See, e.g.,
Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964); List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 906, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) ("[T]he element of reliance has not
been read out of [section] 10(b) and [Rule] . . . lOb-5."), aff'd, 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.
1965); Carr v. Warner, 137 F. Supp. 611, 613 (D. Mass. 1955) (dictum); Nash v. J. Arthur
Warner & Co., 137 F. Supp. 615, 618 (D.Mass. 1955) (dictum); Mills v. Sarjem Corp.,
133 F. Supp. 753, 768 (D.N.J. 1955). It has been advanced that reliance is but a subcategory of causation, i.e., that in certain circumstances, it would be unjust to deny
recovery to a plaintiff who could show that defendant's conduct caused plaintiff's injury
but not reliance. Comment, 74 YALE LJ. 658, 671-72, 685 (1965). Such an approach
seems sound, although it must be noted that a causation requirement is much more
difficult to prove in light of the myriad intervening, independent causes which could
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limits the class of investors who will be protected under lOb-5(2) to
conscientious buyers and sellers in good faith. These are the parties that
the legislation most properly seeks to protect.7 4 Not only should the
plaintiff have to prove that he relied on the defendant's statements, but
he must convince the trier of fact that his reliance was reasonable under
all the circumstances at the time. In this way recovery would be denied to
those who, because of their "business sophistication," acumen, or ready
access to the information involved, 75 could reasonably be expected to
exercise a higher degree of care and investigation in their dealings.
While the proposed duty of care under lOb-5(2) is akin to a "fiduciary"
or "quasi-fiduciary" duty, it can be said to resemble more the common
law duty to refrain from positive actions which entail a substantial xisk of
harming others, if it is conceded that financial harm from negligently
used words is potentially as great, if not greater, than, for example, harm
from negligently driven automobiles. The key factor is the risk of harm
to others when the speaker has greater access to relevant information,
and the proposed duty should be delineated by this concept. Thus, the
speaker's duty to investigate should arise only where it is reasonable to
expect him to foresee that his representations, if false or misleading,
might damage the innocent investor. This limitation is suggested by
reference to negligence theory, for the foreseeability of the resultant
harm is a concept basic to the common law negligence action.70 Its
have affected the price of the security in question. See, e.g., Comment, 32 TExAs L. REv.
197, 210 n.47 (1953). For congressional recognition of this burden in relation to the
1933 Act, see H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1933).
.74 See authorities cited supra note 20; cf. authorities cited supra note 24. See also
Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1962).
75 Cf. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis.), af'd, 319 F.2d 634, 641-42
(7th Cir. 1962), where the court said: "[H]onesty and fairness permit consideration of
the actual and normal business acumen of the seller [plaintiff]. Here the company
could fairly deal with [the plaintiff] . . . in a manner that might not be fair if the
plaintiff had been a novice to stock transactions or the corporation's activities." In
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.
1965), recovery was denied because the plaintiff failed to prove, inter alia, reasonable
reliance on the alleged complete omissions of the defendants. The district court pointed
out that it knew of no one possessing "greater business sophistication" than the
renowned plaintiff, but the circuit court disapproved of this broad approach, stating
that "sophistication or naivete" should not be a per se bar to recovery: "The proper
test is whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently than he did
act if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact." 340 F.2d at 463. Citing
Kohler, supra, the court agreed that the "materiality" of a fact could well depend on
the abilities and opportunities of the plaintiff such that disclosure of the given data
"would have been of little or no concern to him." Id. at 464.
76 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 343-45, 162 N.E. 99, 100-01
(1928) (Cardozo, C. J.): "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be
obeyed ....
If the harm was not willful, he must show that the act as to him had
possibilities of danger so many and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against
the doing of it though the harm was unintended."

MISREPRESENTATIONS UNDER RULE lOb-5

primary value for lOb-5(2) actions is in non-privity cases; a foreseeability
test serves to limit the in terrorem effect of the civil action on good faith
investors by assuring them that, at least under some circumstances, they
need not check every statement they make to ensure it is not false or
misleading. Thus, a director making statements to other directors of
the same corporation might reasonably assume that his listeners are
themselves aware of the facts he is stating or are at any rate capable
of checking them themselves, and that his statements are not likely to
lead his listeners to actionable financial detriment. But the same statements made to an average investor foreseeably could cause the latter
to act upon them. In such a case, because of the director's special access
to information which is unavailable to his listener, it is incumbent
upon him to make accurate and non-misleading statements within the
limits of his access to the pertinent information.
If an insider or experienced trader misrepresents with the qualification
that it is only his opinion or if he identifies the source of the statement
should he still be expected to check its completeness and veracity? Here
again, the key seems to be the foreseeability of the harm and the reasonableness of the plaintiff's alleged reliance on the statement. Obviously
an experienced trader of securities should realize that his opinion may
carry great weight with a novice to the field and that, despite verbal
qualification, his statements might quite conceivably influence the investor's action. In such a case, it would be incumbent on the speaker to
act reasonably to forestall foreseeable harm. 77
77 A further limitation on the duty of care was suggested in Comment, 74 YALE L.J.
658 (1965), where it was said that the duty of diligence and investigation should be
imposed only where statements are made in the course of an "economically motivated"
transaction. Id. at 687. As an example, the author posits a negligently prepared market
letter distributed by broker-dealer A, relied upon by Investor 1, who buys to his
detriment from broker-dealer B. A should be liable, the comment maintains, only if
the letter was distributed "with the object of maintaining or establishing business
associations." Ibid. In this case, A would probably be liable since it is to the firm's
benefit that even investors who are not immediately potential buyers become acquainted
with A's services. Ibid. The difficulty with this approach is the problem of line-drawing.
Unless a per se rule were established that any material statements by a firm or
individual engaged in commercial activities is necessarily "economically motivated,"
the courts would be faced with the Herculean task of examining the ultimate moving
force behind each defendant's statements. The Yale comment distinguishes from the
market letter example the case of negligently overblown statements of earnings by
a corporation, which thereafter neither buys nor sells its own securities. Such statements
might be beneficial to the corporation's "public image" but not to its business
activities "in the same manner" that the market letter assists the broker-dealer's
business. Id. at 688. This distinction would not appear to be one upon which a
comprehensive and definitive formulation of liability can be structured. Rather, it
is preferable to consider "economic motivation" as an element sufficient but not
necessary in establishing the foreseeability of harm. In short, the "economic motivation"
criterion, if viewed broadly, adds little to the delineation of the scope of liability;
if viewed strictly, this criterion would seem to create unnecessary and burdensome
difficulties of proof.
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CONCLUSION

A negligence standard based on the concept of access to information
should obtain in lOb-5(2) actions. Reasonable reliance on the statements
made should be required, and the burden of proving these elements
should remain on the plaintiff. What is negligent and what is reasonable
should depend in each case on the circumstances involved, so that each
party will be charged with the responsibility of his own knowledge,
experience, position and reputation. Lack of privity of contract should
not be a determinative factor where the requisite negligence, foreseeability, and causal effect is established. Such a scheme of recovery should
serve both compensatory and deterrent goals of civil liability by encouraging honesty, competence and stability in the securities market without
unduly hampering the operations of the conscientious investor. And,
finally, such a negligence formula should harmonize the operation of
the express civil liability provision of section 12(2) with the implied
civil liability of lOb-5.

